MANDATORY ANTITRUST LAW AND MULTIPARTY
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
ALEXANDRA THEOBALD
So many vows. They make you swear and swear. Defend the King,
obey the King, obey your father, protect the innocent, defend the
weak. But what if your father despises the King? What if the King
massacres the innocent? It’s too much. No matter what you do,
you’re forsaking one vow or another.1
What is an arbitrator to do? In recent years a choice of law
doctrine has developed in international arbitration that requires the
application of so-called “mandatory law” to antitrust issues. At the
same time an increasing complexity in cross-border transactions has
led to an increase in multiparty arbitrations, further complicating
the choice of law analysis. As multiparty arbitrations increasingly
address competition law issues, tribunals must grapple with the
tension between party autonomy and possibly conflicting
mandatory laws.
Almost all countries now allow the settlement of private
disputes through arbitration.2 Tribunals are empowered to issue
binding awards by the agreement of contracting parties.3 Consent,
or party autonomy, is considered the most important principle in
international arbitration because parties essentially waive their right
to adjudication by a court.4 The benefit of this arrangement is that
1

2012).

Game of Thrones: A Man Without Honor (HBO television broadcast May 13,

2 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(New York, 1958) Status, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html [perma.cc/XTH8-S6GF] (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015) (listing 154 countries who are party to the Convention of approximately 190 total countries in the world).
3 PHILLIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN,
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 9-10
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter GAILLARD] (describing
various national definitions of arbitration as a form of binding agreement between
the parties).
4 NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
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parties can resolve their disputes in a neutral forum5 and enjoy
easier enforcement in foreign jurisdictions where the losing party’s
assets may be located.6 Arbitral awards are enforceable around the
world in any country that has signed on to the New York
Convention.7
This note will address the potential conflicts arbitral tribunals
encounter when deciding antitrust law issues in international
arbitration. It will be argued that the application of mandatory law
creates irreconcilable conflicts that increase costs and detract from
the benefits of international arbitration. The scope of the choice of
law problems is most readily apparent in multiparty arbitration,
though many of the same concerns apply equally to two-party
arbitration. The issue of conflicting mandatory antitrust laws in
arbitration is important given the rise of multi-national corporations
whose continued growth is constrained by a jumble of competition
regulations. More than 111 countries currently have competition
law regimes, the vast majority of which have been adopted only
within the past 25 years.8 Furthermore, the stakes are high and
judgments can reach into the billions of dollars in a single case.9
ARBITRATION, 19 ¶ 1.52 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER] (noting that
consent is essential to a valid arbitration, which in effect functions as a “denationalized or delocalized” proceeding). See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 7(1) (1985) (amended 2006) [hereinafter “MODEL
LAW”], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ arbitration/mlarb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [perma.cc/5V49-RAZD] (stating that arbitration is “an
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have
arisen or which may arise . . . .”).
5 Some national courts tend to favor local parties. See Damjan Kukovec,
International Antitrust – What law in action?¸ 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 35, (2004)
(describing an empirical study that revealed that judges of the ICJ, whose country
is a litigant, vote more frequently in their country’s favor).
6 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 73 n. 518 (2nd ed.
2014) (“There is no ‘universal’ convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, parallel to the New York Convention for arbitral awards.”).
7 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. 3 (New York, 1958) [hereinafter New York Convention], available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-YorkConvention-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL2D-WV7B] (“Each Contracting State shall
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them . . .”); see BORN, supra note 6,
at 109 (“[C]entral to the Convention are Articles III, IV and V, which establish a
basic rule of validity and enforceability of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards
falling within the scope of the Convention.”).
8 Anestis S. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition
Law and Policy 15 (2010).
9 See, e.g., Christie Smythe & Christian Dolmetsch, Visa, Mastercard $5.7 Billion
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The discussion that follows is divided into six sections. Section
one outlines the current legal basis for resolving antitrust issues in
arbitration, and highlights concerns regarding preclusive effects,
multiparty arbitrations, and the requirement of equal treatment.10
Section two explores the major considerations in the choice of
substantive law analysis.11 It discusses the foundations of the
applicability of mandatory law to antitrust disputes and examines
the ways in which the choice of mandatory law may impact the
outcome of the proceeding. Section three suggests solutions for
arbitrators (and arguments to be made by the parties) to resolve
statutory antitrust law issues in multiparty arbitration.12
Considerations of enforceability are weighed against the
countervailing interest of party autonomy and predictability in
contracting. Section four discusses the implications of the choice of
law problems on forum shopping and contract drafting. Finally,
section five recommends policy changes for courts and legislators to
address the concerns raised in the preceding part.13 Section six
concludes.14

Swipe Fee Accord Approved, Bloomberg, Dec. 14, 2013, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-13/visa-mastercard-swipefee-accord-approved-by-u-s-judge [perma.cc/NR5N-RSRE] (reporting the EU
fined Intel 1.06 billion euros for monopolizing the computer chip industry); James
Kanter, European Court Upholds $1.44 Billion Fine Against Intel, N.Y. Times, June 12,
2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/business/international/
european-court-upholds-1-06-billion-fine-against-intel.html?_r=0
[perma.cc/Z63Y-DNN7] (describing “years of litigation” over claims that creditcard swipe fees were improperly fixed).
10 See infra p. 5.
11 See infra p. 11.
12 See infra p. 17.
13 See infra p. 25.
14 See infra p. 29.
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1. ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST ISSUES
To better understand the basis for the current problems in
antitrust arbitration, one must first consider the historical basis for
resolving antitrust law issues in arbitration. Initially thought unarbitrable,15 several jurisdictions in Europe and the United States
now recognize the resolution of antitrust issues in limited
Under the broadest interpretation, arbitral
circumstances.16
tribunals have the authority to adjudicate a statutory private right
of action under applicable national antitrust laws or when raised as
a defense in arbitration.17
1.1. In General
Questions concerning the arbitrability of a claim may itself be
dispositive in an arbitral proceeding. Regardless of the merits of a
case, an arbitral tribunal may not be permitted by law in a given
jurisdiction to decide antitrust matters. If the tribunal nevertheless
issues an award, the losing party can challenge it on grounds of nonarbitrability.18 National courts in the seat of arbitration usually issue

15 See American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
(2nd Cir. 1968) (holding antitrust claims un-arbitrable due to public policy interest
in ensuring proper enforcement).
16 For a description of various country’s approaches to arbitration, see Alexis
Mourre, Arbitrability of Antitrust Law from European and US Perspectives, in EU AND
US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 6-8 (Gordon Blanke &
Phillip Landolt eds., 2011). Arbitral tribunals can order the civil consequences of a
violation of antitrust laws by enjoining a party to cease violating the other's rights,
awarding damages, or invalidating the contract. Id.; see also, JEFFREY KESSLER ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 8:16 (2nd ed. 2014) (describing
arbitrability of antitrust claims in the United States). For a historical perspective,
see Ludwig von Zumbusch, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims under U.S., German, and
EEC law: the International Transaction Criterion and Public Policy, 22 TEX. INT’L L. J.
291, 292 (Spring/Summer 1987) (describing the changing attitudes towards a more
favorable view of arbitrability of antitrust claims).
17 Mourre, supra 16, at 23 ¶ 1-078. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634-38 (1985) (upholding arbitrability of
counterclaimed violations under the Sherman Act).
18 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2)(a) (“Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if [the] subject matter of the difference is
not capable of settlement by arbitration. . .”).
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interlocutory rulings on questions of arbitrability,19 though some
institutional rules also allow the tribunal itself to make that
determination.20
The first prerequisite for an arbitrable claim is the existence of a
private right of action. Primarily Western jurisdictions have
national laws that provide for private enforcement of antitrust or
competition law claims, and have subsequently allowed such claims
to be resolved in arbitration.21 For example, in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that an agreement to arbitrate was enforceable with
respect to antitrust claims under foreign law, but only if the
alternative forum would allow an opportunity to present its
statutory antitrust law claim.22 This holding is problematic. First it
begs the question as to what qualifies as an “opportunity” to present
a claim.23
National approaches to antitrust issues differ
significantly. Being afforded an opportunity to present arguments
alone may not be enough to fulfill a party’s expectations. What the
party is really interested in is an opportunity to obtain specific kinds
of relief, which may not be possible in all situations endorsed by the
court. For example, in the Mitsubishi case the plaintiff was forced to
19 Mourre, supra note 16, at 13 ¶ 1-030 (explaining that issues of arbitrability
are usually decided by courts but may also be decided by arbitrators). See also
Douglas Yarn & Gregory Jones, Legal exclusions and special problems involving statutory claims, in GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
9:14 (2014) (“Federal courts have imposed public policy exceptions to the arbitrability of certain claims under the FAA”).
20 Elizabeth McCallum et al., Cover Stories: Arbitration Procedures, the Rules of the
Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, 19 ANTITRUST A.B.A J. 15, 16-17 (describing
variations in American case law on who decides arbitrability). See also American
Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, R-7(a) available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103
[perma.cc/NR5N-RSRE](establishing that a tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction). But see ICDR, International Dispute Resolution Procedures (2014), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2020868&revision=latestreleased
[perma.cc/Z63YDNN7] (containing no provision for a tribunal’s jurisdiction to rule on issues of
arbitrability).
21 See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 614 (upholding arbitrability of antitrust
claims under arbitration agreement requiring American plaintiff to arbitrate against
Japanese defendant in Japan).
22 Id. at 637.
23 But see Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 n. 19 (suggesting in dicta that choice
of forum and choice of law clauses may waive access to statutory antitrust claims
under U.S. law).
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bring its antitrust claims in a forum much less favorable to
providing antitrust relief. Can this really be considered an adequate
“opportunity” to present a claim? The second problem with the
Mitsubishi holding is that it endorses arbitration of a claim based on
law other than the governing law of the contract. As discussed
below,24 deviating from the party’s choice of law detracts from the
benefits of arbitration by introducing uncertainty and also impinges
on party autonomy.
1.2. Preclusive Effects
The issue of preclusion in arbitration is highly debated.25 In
general, claims decided in arbitration are given preclusive effect in
any subsequent litigation between the same parties—as would be
the case with a judgment issued by a court.26 Unlike a court
judgment, however, arbitral awards are not subject to appeal and
are afforded much greater deference by foreign courts.27 Under the
New York Convention, arbitral awards can only be reviewed for
procedural fairness and may not be challenged on the merits.28
See § 2 infra.
See, BORN, supra note 6, at 1112 (“Although it is widely recognized that arbitral awards have binding, res judicata effects, the precise nature of those effects . . .
is debated.”); Gretta Walters, Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Do Res Judicata
Challenges in International Arbitration Constitute Jurisdictional or Admissibility Problems? 29 J. Int’l Arb. 6, pp. 651-680. At 651 (2012) (“While the legal principle of res
judicata is widely recognized in domestic laws and by international tribunals, its
scope and meaning are unsettled topics.”); Compare Nathalie Voser & Julie Raneda,
Recent Developments on the Doctrine of Res Judicata in International Arbitration from a
Swiss Perspective: A Call for a Harmonized Solution, 33 ASA Bulletin Vol. 4, pp. 749779 (2015) (discussing various recent decisions in Switzerland on the preclusive effect of prior proceedings and setting a high bar for preclusion) with Katherine Jonckheere, Avoiding Re-litigation of Identical Issues at the Enforcement Stage: A Deferential
Approach, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG February 3, 2016 (advocating a deferential approach) available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 2016/02/03/avoiding-relitigation-of-identical-issues-at-the-enforcement-stage-a-deferential-approach/
[https://perma.cc/B5F3-AHGZ].
26 Allen Scott Rau, The Arbitrator and Mandatory Rules of Law, 18 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 51, 58 (2007) (agreeing that a decision on the merits on a statutory claim should
and is intended to give “res judicata” effect to statutory claims under the holding
in Mitsubishi); BORN, supra note 6, at 3738-3739 (preclusion is a matter of international law).
27 BORN, supra note 6, at 3185 (“An annulment court does not review the arbitral tribunal’s decision in the nature of an appellate proceeding, but instead considers only whether one of a specified number of defined statutory grounds for annulment is present.”).
28 BORN, supra note 6, at 3185 citing New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 7.
24
25
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Some have raised concerns that arbitration is an inappropriate
forum to resolve antitrust issues. Critics argue that the arbitral
tribunal may not have the same expertise,29 and it certainly does not
have the same public responsibilities as a state regulatory agency.
Questions of market definition often benefit from third-party
evidence—which a tribunal is unable to compel.30 Despite these
concerns, considerations of party autonomy suggest that parties
should be allowed to define the scope of their arbitration agreements
to include antitrust issues, and the resulting awards should be given
the same weight as adjudications by national courts or
administrative agencies. If arbitral decisions on antitrust issues
really were inferior, parties would learn to exclude them from their
arbitration agreements.
Due to the contractual nature of the forum, arbitral awards can
only have preclusive effect on the actual parties to the proceeding.31
International arbitration is premised on consent, and should not
purport to bind third parties.32 However, the very nature of
antitrust law concerns market effects.33 A key distinction must
therefore be made concerning the role of an arbitral tribunal in the
resolution of antitrust issues in contrast to a regulatory authority.
The goals of private party actions are “to secure relief and end
misconduct,” whereas a public regulator also seeks to “effectuate
29 See Mourre, supra note 16, at 23 § 1-078 (noting arbitral tribunals will become
more experienced with antitrust law issues as they are more frequently presented
in arbitration).
30 McCallum, supra note 20, at 7; Renato Nazzini, Parallel Proceedings before the
Tribunal and the Courts/Competition Authorities, in EU AND US ANTITRUST
ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 890-891 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip
Landolt eds., 2011).
31 See, BORN, supra note 6, at 3751 (“An award will have preclusive effects only
if the subsequent proceedings involved the ‘parties’ to the arbitration or their ‘privies’”); See also, New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (“Each Contracting State
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractua1 or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”) (emphasis added).
32 Id. See also Born, supra note 6, at 1407-08 (describing the nature of consent to
arbitration); Granite Rock v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010) (refusing to compel arbitration upon finding defendant did not consent to submit specific issue to arbitration).
33 WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL & JAMES D. HURWITZ, Chapter 42: Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement in EU AND US
ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTIONERS (Kluwer Law International
2011).
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enforcement policies, establish precedent, explain new learning,
earn broad compliance, and reestablish competition in the
market.”34 The scope of the arbitral award must therefore be
restricted to the issues presented by the parties, and cannot impose
externalities on others who cannot take part in the arbitration.35
1.3. Multiparty Arbitration
As corporate structures and business transactions become more
complex, arbitrations increasingly involve more than two parties.36
Antitrust cases in particular commonly involve multiple parties in
part because any allegation of collusion necessarily involves more
than one co-conspirator and therefore more than one potential
defendant. When multiple parties are involved in a dispute, they
have an interest in efficiently resolving their dispute in a single
arbitration that is binding on all of them.37 Requiring parties to
arbitrate their claims separately is inefficient and has the potential
to generate inconsistent and unfair results.38
Id.
Regulatory agencies often allow public comment or the submission of amicus briefs by third-parties that might potentially be affected by an impending regulatory decision. This type of participation generally is not possible in the arbitration context. See BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATION: MULTIPARTY,
MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 192 (Kluwer Law International
2006) (noting that briefs amicus curiae generally are not allowed in arbitrations
other than under NAFTA, ICSID, or the WTO). But see JEFF WAINCYMER, The Process
of an Arbitration: Complex Arbitration, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 602 (2012), at 602 (“[A]micus submissions have been accepted in disputes which have a strong public interest dimension, in particular investor-state
and competition law disputes . . . .”).
36 JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 376 (KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL 2003) [hereinafter Lew] About 40%
of arbitration cases worldwide involve more than two parties, and that number has
been rapidly increasing for twenty years. Nathalie Voser, Multiparty Disputes and
Joinder of Third Parties, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York
Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, Vol 14, pp. 343-410 at 342
(2009).
37 Id. This analysis assumes that there is a valid arbitration agreement binding
on all parties. In the absence of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate, parties may
conclude an arbitration agreement after a dispute has arisen. Alternatively, some
jurisdictions at least in the U.S. have been willing to extend jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal over parties who are accused of colluding with a party to an arbitration
agreement. See JLM Indus. V. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F .3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); MS
Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F .3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999); Fujian Pac. Elec. Co.
v. Bechtel Power Corp., 2004 WL 2645974, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004).
38 Lew, supra note 36, at 377.
34
35
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In multiparty arbitration, an important consideration is the
requirement that all parties must receive equal treatment in
resolving their dispute.39 This includes a responsibility to only
consider the issues and evidence presented by parties to the
arbitration agreement and to avoid being influenced by outsiders
who are not part of the arbitration.40 To do otherwise would violate
the notion that arbitration is a product of individual party autonomy
and could potentially risk non-enforcement of the award.41
Arbitration is a product of contract and the tribunal’s authority
derives entirely from the authority granted by the parties.42 By
choosing arbitration, the parties waive a quite substantial right—the
right to trial. Much like a court is limited to considering only issues
within its subject matter jurisdiction on evidence properly admitted,
it would be inapposite for an arbitral tribunal to consider issues
beyond the scope granted by the parties or to consider evidence that
the parties themselves have not supplied. In the context of antitrust
law claims, this means that arbitrators should only consider the
evidence and legal positions actually provided by the parties in the
dispute.
Equal treatment also requires that the parties retain substantially
the same substantive rights and remedies in arbitration as would be
available under national law. For example, by statute national
courts and the European Commission have the ability to give
individual exemptions to parties under existing competition laws
for policy reasons.43 If a party instead chooses to go to arbitration,
the arbitrator must have the ability to grant the same exemption.44
Provisions like this complicate multiparty arbitration, however,
because not all parties may be subject to the same laws and thus
exemptions may be available for some but not others.
Id. at 408.
Id.
41 See New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(c) (“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused [if the] award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. .
.”).
42 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 329 ¶ 5.48 (describing the contractual
school of arbitration which posits that the relationship between the arbitrators and
the parties is one of contract). See also Rau, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
39
40

Mourre, supra note 16, at 46 n. 261 (noting that equal treatment is implicated by the availability of an exemption under Article 81(3)).
44 Id.
43
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Further, questions concerning joinder and consolidation are
particularly salient in this context. On the one hand, adding
additional parties to the arbitration has the potential to drastically
change the scope of the legal issues in the proceeding and may
increase the amount of evidence available to the tribunal.45 On the
other hand, the complications resulting from the application of
multiple mandatory antitrust laws raise concerns over the ability of
a tribunal to issue an enforceable award that is binding on all
parties.46 This is an important concern, because unequal treatment
of the parties in arbitration is grounds for non-enforcement of the
arbitral award.47
2. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS
Choice of law in international arbitration can have a
determinative effect not only on the outcome of a dispute, but also
on whether a claim is even heard by a tribunal in the first place.
Uncertainty surrounding the choice of law is a cost born by the
parties and makes alternate dispute resolution by arbitration less
attractive. 48
The relevant points to keep in mind are that parties are free to
select the governing law of the contract49 and that of the arbitration
agreement,50 and these choices are generally upheld under
principles of party autonomy.51 Nevertheless, some have argued
LEW, supra note 35, at 408.
YVES DERAINS & ERIC SCHWARTZ, GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION,
183 (2nd ed. 2005) (noting that due to enforcement concerns, tribunals constituted
under the ICC rules have used the consolidation provision “sparingly”).
47 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(c).
48 See BORN, supra note 6, at 900-01 (“The choice-of-law complexities that arise
in international arbitration do not comport with the ideals of predictability and efficiency of the arbitral process.”); Charles Brower II, Arbitration and Antitrust: Navigating the Contours of Mandatory Law, 59 BUFFALO L. REV. 1172, 1132, 1140 (2011)
(Whether through continued application by tribunals, or continued enforcement by
national courts, “the pursuit of expediency outside the normal bounds of party autonomy seems likely to harm the integrity of the arbitral process”).
49 Also referred to as the lex contractus.
50 Also referred to as the lex arbitri.
51 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 195-96 ¶¶ 3.94, 3.97. See, e.g., LCIA Arbitration Rules, London Court of International Arbitration, (2014 Amendments) art.
22.3 available at http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx [perma.cc/GXK3-CQJB] (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide
the parties' dispute in accordance with the law(s) or rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the merits of their dispute.”).
45
46
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that at least in the context of statutory claims, we should not assume
“that the law that may govern the performance of the substantive
terms of their bargain tells us everything we need to know about the
merits of . . . extra-contractual causes of action.”52
With respect to antitrust issues, the choice of law applied to
arbitrability as well as the choice of law governing the substance of
the dispute may be determinative. The lex arbitri governing the
procedural issues (e.g. whether the dispute is arbitrable) is likely to
be governed by a body of law that is different from that applied to
the merits (e.g. the standard for evaluating a substantive claim).53
The topic of this note focuses on the latter: however similar issues
are also presented by the conflict of laws rules applied to
arbitrability.54
2.1. Foundations of Mandatory Law
Despite most national arbitration laws authorizing the tribunal
to look to principles of international law55 and to supplement the
governing law absent express agreement by the parties,56 the
Rau, supra note 26, at 65.
REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 173 ¶ 3.34 (noting that since arbitration
is often seated in a “neutral” jurisdiction, the procedural law will generally be different from the law that governs the substantive matters in the dispute).
54 For example, many of the arguments made regarding the multiplicity of conflicting mandatory substantive laws may also arise with respect to questions of arbitrability. A national court could potentially refuse to enforce an award with respect to antitrust issues on either the arbitrability ground or the public policy
ground. See New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2) (enforcement of an award
may be refused if “[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that country, or [. . .] enforcement of the award
would be contrary to public policy.”).
55 MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art. 2A (“In the interpretation of this Law, regard
is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application.”).
56 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 235 ¶ 3.222 (summarizing the intention
of the model law and various arbitration rules to allow the arbitral tribunal to select
the governing law in absence of agreement by the parties, and to allow for the application of individual rules from various jurisdictions to different aspects of a dispute). See e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, International Chamber of Commerce, (2012
Amendments) art. 21(1), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/
[perma.cc/2YZS-C2SS] [hereinafter ICC Arbitration Rules] (“In the absence of [. . .]
agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to
be appropriate”); MODEL LAW, supra note 4, at art. 28 (“Failing any designation by
the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of
laws rules which it considers applicable”).
52
53
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application of foreign law to the resolution of antitrust law issues
has proven particularly difficult. When antitrust issues first became
arbitrable, many jurisdictions refused to enforce awards under the
public policy exception in Article V of the New York Convention.57
National courts objected to the perceived incursion of arbitral
tribunals into the sphere of market regulation58 and feared that
arbitral tribunals would reduce the deterrent effect by incorrectly
adjudicating claims on the merits more favorably to would-be
defendants than if a claim were brought in open court.59
Citing requirements under institutional rules to make “best
efforts” to render enforceable awards,60 tribunals shifted their choice
of law analysis to account for possible public policy objections of the
jurisdictions where enforcement is most likely to occur.61
Commonly referred to as the “mandatory law” because of its
perceived unavoidability, it does not in fact refer to any uniform
body, law or method of interpretation.
Different jurisdictions apply varying levels of scrutiny to the
57 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2) (“Recognition and enforcement
of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: [. . .] the recognition or
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country”).
See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, Case C-126/97 (European Ct. of Justice 1999) (upholding applicability of European Competition law as
public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral award).
58 C.f. Kukovec, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the European Commission and
the United States Federal Trade Comission’s blocking of the General Electric/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas mergers as “almost escalat[ing] into a trade
war).
59 Mark Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62
St. John L. Rev. 1, 4 (2012).
60 See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 56, art. 41 (“[T]he arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that
the award is enforceable at law”). But see, LCIA Arbitration Rules, London Court
of International Arbitration, art. 32.2 (2014 Amendments) available at
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.
aspx [perma.cc/H7NC-7MA9] ("[T]he Arbitral Tribunal [. . .] shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognised and enforceable at the
arbitral seat. . . .”) (emphasis added).
61 Stavros Brekoulakis, On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New
Areas of Concern, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, International Arbitration Law Library, Vol. 19, at ¶ 2-36 (Loukas
Mistelis & Stavros Brekoulakis eds., 2009) (noting that arbitral tribunals can consider the mandatory rules of a country other than the governing law chosen by the
parties, and “[u]ltimately, it is upon the arbitrator deciding the particular case
whether to take the enforcement factor into account or not”).
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application of mandatory law.62 In general, European courts have
been most favorable to the concept of mandatory law,63 though the
United States has also required that U.S. antitrust principles be
considered where “the effects of the underlying agreement [is] felt
in the United States.”64 Critics argue that the practice ignores the
intention—and explicit choice—of the parties.65 Others have
suggested that applying mandatory law is unprincipled and
politically motivated, bringing the field of arbitration into
disrepute.66 Nevertheless, this practice continues widely.67
2.2. Choice of Mandatory Law
Assuming the conflicts of laws analysis in a given jurisdiction
allows the application of mandatory laws to antitrust disputes, the
next inquiry is to decide which mandatory law to apply. The parties
in arbitration may have assets in multiple jurisdictions, and given
that awards can be annulled on public policy grounds the law of the
arbitral seat must also be considered.68 The latter concern means an
arbitral tribunal can effectually only apply a foreign mandatory
antitrust law which does not conflict with, and preferably
synergizes with, the law of the arbitral seat.69
62 Brower, supra note 48, at 1147 (“Given the vast differences in approach by
national courts, tribunals may devote more or less attention to local mandatory
laws depending on the anticipated level of judicial review at the seat of arbitration.”).
63 Id. at 1148-52.
64 Thomas H. Webster & Michael Buhler, Handbook of ICC Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents, Materials 314 ¶ 21-58 (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2014).
65 Brower, Supra note 48, at 1129-30 (mandatory laws . . . enable adjudicators
to apply important regulatory norms enacted by the place of adjudication . . . without regard to (and often in contravention to) private agreements about the governing law.”).
66 Id. at 1138 n. 32, citing PHILLIP LANDOLT, MODERNISED EC COMPETITION LAW
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶6-07, at 108 (2006) (“[The failure to apply mandatory laws] brings arbitration into disrepute and thus jeopardizes it as an institution”).
67 Id. at 1128 n. 4 (quoting leading commentators on the increasing application
of mandatory law to antirust issues); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 205-07 ¶¶
3.128 – 3.135 (“[P]erhaps the most frequently encountered instance of the application of mandatory law is competition or anti-trust law”).
68 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(e) (Enforcement may be refused if an award “has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”).
69 Note that because of the annulment issue, tribunals will be more likely to
favor applying the law of the arbitral seat even though this may conflict with the
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The choice of law is important because jurisdictions differ
substantially in their approach to antitrust policy.70 Antitrust laws
in the United States focus on consumer protection, are hostile to
highly concentrated markets, and are less focused on regulating
efficiency.71 In contrast, European Union competition laws seek to
further economic integration between member states, raising the
economic competitiveness of worse-off nations, and promoting the
free-flow of goods across borders.72 Initially focused on private law
issues, the European Union has only recently taken on a more
regulatory function in the realm of competition law.73
On the other hand, Switzerland74 has taken a contrary position
governing law of the contract or create enforcement issues in the jurisdiction of the
losing party. The calculus is that an award enforceable only in the jurisdiction of
the losing party would be useless if it could be annulled in the national courts of
the arbitral seat. See generally, BERNARD HANOTIAU, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
ARBITRABILITY, IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND
AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, ICCA CONGRESS
SERIES, Vol. 9, 158 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1998) (outlining the factors an arbitrator will apply when deciding whether to apply foreign policy considerations to
questions of arbitrability).
70 C.f., Kyle Robertson, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Analysis in the Wake of GE/Honeywell, 31 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 153 (2008) (noting that
U.S. and E.U. antitrust regulators came to opposite conclusions concerning the proposed GE-Honeywell merger); Dianne P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 405-406 (2002) (comparing
differing approaches in OECD countries versus developing countries to questions
of national treatment in antitrust laws, and suggesting that developing countries
are motivated by different policy objectives of spreading economic wealth among
locals).
71 Eleanor Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION POLICY 339, 340-341 (Edward Montgomery Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997). See also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (banning actual or attempted monopolization and the restraint of trade).
72 Fox, supra note 71, at 339, 340-341; see also, Treaty of Rome, European Community, art. 85(3) (1957) (Mergers that would otherwise be voidable may be exempted if they “[contribute] to improving the production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit”) available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art81_en.html [perma.cc/W89Q-5JDD]
73 Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 226 (2001).
74 Brower, supra note 48, at 1159 (noting that “parties wishing to avoid European competition law reportedly provided for Swiss arbitration” but were unsuccessful as the Swiss Federal Tribunal later held EU competition laws nevertheless
applicable); see Tribunale federale [DTF] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 13, 1998, X
SA v. Y SA, Judgment of Nov. 13, 1998, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 511, 513 (Switz.) (holding that arbitrators must consider EU competition law when the parties are from
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on the subject of mandatory law, and professed that antitrust law is
Though EU
not a matter of international public policy.75
competition law may still apply in cases where the parties have
sufficient ties to the European Union, under Swiss law “an award
rendered in Switzerland may not be set aside due to an incorrect
application of EU competition law by the arbitrators.”76 By
comparison, Switzerland is therefore far less concerned with
controlling the application of a coherent antitrust law policy than
either the United States or the European Union.
It is important to remember that arbitral tribunals are the
product of contract law, and therefore serve a different role in
society than courts.77 As more national courts and arbitral tribunals
find antitrust issues arbitrable, it will become impossible for
arbitrators to avoid ruling on these issues. While national courts
have often elected to dismiss claims based on foreign antitrust laws,
foreign regulatory interests have not been ignored in the choice of
law analysis.78 Further, an international arbitration tribunal by its
very nature does not have the authority to decline jurisdiction on the
basis that a claim is based on foreign law—nor should it. Therefore
an arbitrator’s consideration of appropriate foreign regulatory
interests in issuing an arbitral award is a natural extension of
established practice. The point is that arbitration has the potential
to improve the way parties resolve disputes, and these benefits are
stifled by holding arbitrations to the same public policy objectives
as national courts.
2.3. Joinder
Joinder presents a particular difficulty in the context of antitrust
arbitration because it further complicates the choice of law analysis.
As a theoretical matter, the joinder of an additional party should not
alter the choice of law applicable to a given dispute between the
the EU and one party invokes its provisions).
75 Tribunale federale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 13, 1998, X SA v. Y
SA, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 511, 513 (Switz).
76 KLAUS PETER BERGER, CORRECTION, INTERPRETATION AND SETTING ASIDE OF THE
AWARD, IN PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, ARBITRATION 665 (3rd ed. 2015).
77 Rau, supra note 26, at 53 (“[A]rbitration, as part of a process of private government and self-determination, should be understood through the lenses of contract rather than of adjudication.”).
78 Buxbaum, supra note 73, at 235-237.
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existing parties.79 However, a conflict may arise where the
additional party is located in a jurisdiction different from the parties
who are already part of the arbitration, thus implicating an
alternate—and possibly conflicting—mandatory law. Parties may
be joined either as additional claimants or respondents, however the
choice of law issues are more likely to be determinative when a party
is joined as respondent as this is the party against whom an award
is most likely to be issued. Additionally, parties joined as
respondents are also more likely to raise defenses based on antitrust
law.
Thus, an arbitral tribunal deciding which antitrust law to apply
in multiparty arbitration must seek to harmonize the potentially
conflicting mandates of (1) the law of the arbitral seat, (2) the laws
of the most likely jurisdiction where enforcement against
respondent parties would be sought, (3) the laws of the jurisdiction
of any of the claimant parties against which a counterclaim based in
antitrust law has been raised, and potentially (4) the law of the
jurisdiction of the additional party to be joined. Given the current
state of affairs, this is at times an impossible task.
3. SOLUTIONS FOR ARBITRATORS
The following discussion will demonstrate the ways in which all
of the current solutions available to arbitral tribunals are
inadequate. All have the potential to leave the whole or part of an
award unenforceable. Especially for larger awards, the winning
party may need to apply for enforcement in multiple jurisdictions.
The tribunal can only choose to apply one country’s governing law
at a time. As the quote at the opening of this comment depicts, when
faced with conflicting mandates a tribunal is always left to
disappoint one jurisdiction or another.
In all cases the tribunal will need to determine whether a
fundamental tension between competing antitrust laws exists. If all
potential rules would make available the same rights and remedies
to the parties, and yield substantially the same result on the facts,
the issue need not be decided. However, given that many countries
have resisted harmonization of antitrust laws,80 this outcome is
79 HANOTIAU, supra note 35, at 183 (interpreting experience with a case where
the CEPANI appointments committee declined consolidation which would have
required the resolution of additional issues under a different applicable law).
80 John McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization,
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unlikely in all but a minority of multiparty and joinder cases.81
Under the current state of affairs, if the antitrust policies in the
various place of enforcement differ substantially, the tribunal may
not be able to write a sufficiently enforceable award. Tribunals can
resolve this tension in a number of ways, some of which are more or
less consistent with the fundamental premises of arbitration. This
section will consider the costs and benefits of the most practical
options, and suggest ways to minimize risk. As always, tribunals
must work within the limits of their authority or face nonenforcement.82
3.1. Law of the Seat
The law of the seat is relevant for two main reasons: (1) national
courts can set aside arbitral awards on public policy grounds,83 and
(2) the choice of seat may be interpreted as explicit consent by the
parties to be subject to its laws.84 As discussed, the public policy
ground for annulment is the justification for applying mandatory
antitrust law. Competition law statutes are considered matters of
public policy in many jurisdictions, and in many jurisdictions a
losing party could apply to the national court “in the place the
award was made” to annul an award on antitrust or other regulatory
issues if the law applied does not conform to local law.85 Perhaps
for this reason, some jurisdictions have also interpreted the explicit
choice of the seat as an implicit agreement to be bound by public
policy choices of the arbitral seat.86
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 593 (2003) (arguing against antitrust harmonization
because it has high agency costs and reduces long-run experimentation and innovation in antitrust).
81 See also, Rau, supra note 26, at 89 (noting that the explanatory force of an
arbitral tribunal’s reasoning declines as the number of considered laws and jurisdictions increases).
82 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V. (stating the conditions under
which an authority could refuse to enforce the award).
83 BORN, supra note 6, at 3163-64 (noting that many national arbitration statutes
and the UNCITRAL Model Law allow for annulment in the place the award was
made on the ground that “the award is contrary to public policy”). see also
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, at art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (“An award may be set
aside [by a national court if] the court finds that: [. . .] the award is in conflict with
the public policy of this State.”).
84 Rau, supra note 26, at 74-75.
85 BORN, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
86 BORN, supra note 6, at 622 note 10(c) (“[N]ational courts in the arbitral seat
are usually competent (and exclusively competent) to entertain actions to annul or
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3.2. Governing Law of the Contract
The obvious solution would be to apply the governing law of the
contract, or lex contractus. This body of law may be the same or
different as that of the arbitral seat, and hopefully the governing law
is at least compatible with the lex arbitri.87 What if a mismatch exists
between the antitrust policies under the law of the seat and the law
of the contract?
Under the current practice tribunals would be wise to defer to
the law of the seat. An unenforceable award is of little use to the
prevailing party. Given the widely accepted (though misguided)
application of mandatory law under the guise of public policy, the
safer choice for an arbitral tribunal is to opt for the law of the arbitral
seat so as to avoid annulment there. This outcome should seem
unfair; after all it violates the explicit choice of the parties. This
example demonstrates the fundamental problem with the way
antitrust laws are currently handled in arbitration. The better
solution would be for arbitral tribunals to issue awards based on the
law of the contract, and for national courts to enforce them even
when they conflict with the public policy objectives under national
law. This argument is discussed further below.88
3.3. Place Where Conduct Occurred
The law of the place where alleged misconduct occurs is clearly
legally relevant. To that end, some arbitrators have even found it
inappropriate for arbitral tribunals to apply mandatory law to the
extent that (1) the parties chose an alternate governing law and (2)
the allegedly violative conduct occurred outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the law governing the dispute.89 To do so would
set aside” awards, and that some jurisdictions allow very limited review while others allow “extensive public policy inquiries.”); see also, BORN, supra note 6, at 979
note 21(b)) (citing ICC Award No. 4132 for the proposition that “an arbitrator’s
overriding duty is to render an enforceable award, and impliedly that this requires
consideration of public policy defenses and claims).
87 See supra § 2.
88 See infra §5.1.
89 Rau, supra note 26, at 59 (citing ICC Case No.6320, XX Y.B Comm. Arb. 62
(ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) at ¶¶ 151, 159 and stating that “even if” American courts were
to interpret the statute as calling for the application of treble damages in such a case,
“the acceptable interest to stop activities such as those covered by RICO also outside the United States is not, by itself, sufficient to lead to mandatory extraterritorial
application in international arbitration.”).
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imply that the nation promulgating such laws “has some sort of
police authority for international trade outside [its] territory” or that
the laws were a representative “expression of ‘international public
policy.’”90 Thus, arbitral tribunals must not only consider whether
a choice of law has jurisdiction over the parties, but also whether
there is jurisdiction over the present dispute.
3.4. Finding the Money
Alternatively, the tribunal could choose to apply the mandatory
law of the country where enforcement of the largest portion of the
award would likely to be required. The benefit to the plaintiff would
be that both antitrust as well as other related claims would be
resolved in a single arbitration, while ensuring that at least the most
significant portion of the claim will be enforceable. This procedure
however would greatly disadvantage the defendant, who may raise
an objection to unequal treatment on the grounds that the plaintiff
would receive greater control over the parameters of the arbitration.
Allowing the plaintiff to forum shop for the jurisdictional rules that
would result in the largest enforcement capabilities would impose a
policy choice on the parties that is necessarily pro-antitrust
enforcement. Before doing so, however, the tribunal should make a
holistic assessment of the various policies governing the parties, and
ensure that any implicit policy choice comports with fundamental
fairness. Nevertheless, the procedural fairness objections are not the
only problem with implementing this strategy.
This solution is problematic because the reasoning is inherently
circular. The place of enforcement will depend on who the
successful party is, which in turn may depend on which law is
applied.91 Moreover, it may be unclear which party faces the largest
potential liability, or where the most significant assets of that party
are located. Choosing the governing law in this way could
potentially be arbitrary, and would therefore be subject to
criticism.92

Id. at ¶ 156.
Rau, supra note 26, at 82.
92 Born, supra note 6, at 2615 (“[D]ifferences between national laws and procedures can be great . . . the need for predictability and stability is particularly substantial and . . . the risks of arbitraty or discriminatory legislative or judicial actions
are especially acute [in international commercial matters].”)
90
91
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3.5. Applying Multiple Mandatory Laws
Particularly in multiparty arbitrations, the tribunal could end up
applying different mandatory laws to each claim against each
respondent—in effect, joining the claims for purposes of the
proceeding and then severing them before issuing the arbitral
award. Ironically, such an approach could actually hasten
innovation and improve antitrust regulations worldwide. Some
have argued that arbitration in general tests the “inherent
soundness” of established law, and allows tribunals to consider
more freely “whether the policy underlying the rule has truly been
implicated.”93 Moreover, in the case of multiparty arbitration,
applying multiple mandatory laws could create a forum to directly
compare the results of different rules applied to the same set of
facts.94 This information, to the extent that it becomes available,95
could then be used by legislatures to tailor national competition
laws to more reliably achieve their desired outcomes.
Although the application of multiple mandatory antitrust laws
to different parties in a multiparty arbitration would address some
concerns, this solution is painfully imperfect. The law of the arbitral
seat may still conflict with the law of the most likely place of
enforcement, or it may be unclear where the enforcement will
eventually be sought. Non-enforceable awards could still result.
There is also a chance that the results would be inconsistent as
between the parties. This may negatively affect the parties’
relationship, particularly if one party is treated less favorably
compared to the same conduct arising out of the same contract.
Furthermore, this solution comes at a substantial financial cost.
While there are some efficiency gains from holding a single
proceeding to decide common questions of fact between the parties,
there may be few common questions of law. When applying
Rau, supra note 26, at 87.
Provided of course the parties allow the opinions to be published. See 2015
International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration, Queen Mary Univ. London, White & Case LLP at 22 (“The suggestion that
institutions should publish awards in redacted form (and/or as summaries was accordingly . . . favoured for its academic value and usefulness when arguing a case.
. . .”) available at http://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf.
95 This does not mean that confidentiality could not be maintained. Scholarly
commentators and even arbitral institutions sometimes publish case notes including the arguments advanced and the legal conclusions reached by the tribunal. To
protect confidentiality, the names and identifying facts are redacted or omitted.
93
94

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

1080

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:3

different substantive laws to the parties, counsel will need to make
separate submissions to the tribunal, and the arbitrators will have to
expend time and effort crafting individual awards based on various
legal standards. This duplication of effort increases the financial
costs of this dispute resolution mechanism, and could be avoided if
a single governing law (such as the law of the contract) could be
applied in an enforceable way.
3.6. Refusing Joinder
The least likely resolution would be for the tribunal to refuse
joinder of any additional party with a conflicting mandatory law.
Tribunals have discretion under the institutional rules that allow
joinder.96 The benefit of this tactic is that it avoids the issuance of an
award which would likely be unenforceable, while potentially
preserving a claim against the additional party. However, this
option is unattractive because it potentially violates the parties’ right
to arbitrate against the parties of their choosing and may result in
multiple proceedings on similar issues. Despite the conflict of law
issues and the attendant enforcement difficulties the parties may
still prefer to hold a joint arbitration with all the relevant parties.
4. IMPLICATIONS
The point of arbitration is to generate an enforceable award.
What good is winning on the merits in a dispute if one cannot collect
the spoils? The problems created by the application of mandatory
antitrust laws in arbitration lead parties to engage in inefficient and
negative-value behavior that undermines the benefits to
international arbitration. Specifically, parties are incentivized to
engage in forum shopping at the enforcement and adjudication
stages, and to waste resources by spending additional time drafting
strategic arbitration clauses.
4.1. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping may occur at the enforcement stage. Winning
parties will try to enforce their award in jurisdictions with favorable
antitrust laws, and in fact may have to apply to multiple
96 LEW, supra note 36, at 289-290 (describing the standards for third-party joinder under the LCIA and CCIG arbitration rules and noting that tribunals have final
discretion).
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jurisdictions in order to collect the full amount of an award.97
Worryingly, parties may even be tempted to argue the enforcement
prospects at the adjudication stage to encourage the arbitral tribunal
to apply the competition laws of a particular jurisdiction (which is
otherwise unconnected to the dispute) when rendering the award.
For example, if a claimant becomes aware that respondent has assets
located in a jurisdiction favorable to antitrust enforcement, the
claimant may urge the tribunal to apply the substantive antitrust
laws of that jurisdiction even in the face of other substantive laws
that have a closer nexus to the dispute. This is problematic because
it adds uncertainty and increases the cost of arbitration by inviting
spurious argumentation choice of law issues.
A tribunal may be swayed by such arguments to the extent that
producing enforceable awards affects the ability of an arbitrator to
obtain future appointments. No one wants to hire an arbitrator who
has a history of producing unenforceable awards. Not only will the
disappointed party who was unable to enforce their award be
disinclined to hire or recommend their arbitrators in the future, but
other potential clients will know not to hire those arbitrators since—
unlike arbitral awards—enforcement proceedings are publically
available because they must be filed in open court.
Conversely, parties seeking to avoid enforceability will have
every incentive to disperse their assets to more favorable
jurisdictions. Given the premise that awards will only be
enforceable where the award conforms to national public policy
interests, a losing party could avoid paying damages on an award
simply by moving their assets to jurisdictions that have adopted
policies inconsistent with those applied in the award. This may not
be possible in every case, but even if it happens only in a small
fraction of cases this has the potential to seriously vitiate the benefits
of resolving antitrust disputes in international arbitration. Thus,
forum shopping both in favor of and opposed to antitrust
regulations will lead to a lack of uniformity, unfair applications of
foreign law, and skewed results in arbitration.

97 Rau, supra note 26, at 82 (citing the “the transitory nature of ‘assets’ in an
electronic world” as one factor making it “impossible for the arbitrators to predict
with any accuracy just which jurisdictions may later be called on to recognize an
award.”).
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4.2. For Drafting Arbitration Agreements
Given the extensive reach asserted by their national courts,98
companies with strong ties in the European Union or the United
States are unable to “contract out” of statutory antitrust
enforcement. The goal in drafting arbitration agreements therefore
should be to mitigate the potential problems should a multiparty
international arbitration on antitrust issues occur. An explicit choice
of antitrust law in an arbitration agreement alone would not be
effective. Fearing non-enforcement, tribunals have shown a
willingness to ignore explicit selections in favor of unpredictable
mandatory law.99
The most effective tool in drafting an arbitration agreement in
anticipation of possible multiparty antitrust arbitration would be to
select an arbitral seat and a set of institutional rules whose policies
match the enforcement profile of the parties. Parties whose business
plan involves taking advantage of economies of scale should seek
the protection of rules that favor free markets and nonintervention.100 Small businesses and new market entrants who
98 See Kyle Robertson, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Analysis
in the Wake of GE/Honeywell, 31 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 153 (2008) (discussing the
implications of the European Commission’s blocking of the proposed merger between two U.S. companies: GE and Honeywell). C.f., Dimitrios-Panagiotis L.
Tzakas, Civil Antitrust Liability in the International Context: From Empagran to the Rome
II Regulation, 37 DAJV NEWSLETTER 19 (2012) (reviewing the history of extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws by U.S. and European courts); Juliette Gardside,
From Google to Amazon: EU goes to war against powers of US digital giants, GUARDIAN,
(Jul. 5, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/jul/06/google-amazon-europe-goes-to-war-power-digital-giants
[perma.cc/E69B-E9EC] (describing European regulators investigation and criticism
of U.S. based company Google for its near monopoly of internet searches in Europe
likening it to a threat to national sovereignty).
99 See Brower, supra note 48.
100 E.g. Switzerland when none of the parties is based in an E.U. member state.
Switzerland has historically engaged in limited antitrust enforcement, and unlike
in the U.S. consumers in Switzerland do not have standing to bring private suits to
enforce antitrust laws. Bernhard C. Lauterburg and Philipp E. Zurkinden, Ch. 25:
Switzerland in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW at 360 (7th ed. 2014);
But see, Federal Tribunal [TF] [Swiss Supreme Court] Mar. 8, 2006, 4P.278/2005 at
¶ 3.2 (Switz.) (refusing to annul arbitral award for violation of public policy when
it applied European competition laws to European parties). In general, smaller
economies that are open to trade have less incentive for strong antitrust enforcement because concentrated domestic companies are more competitive abroad and
the negative domestic effects of monopolization are limited by the fact that most of
the goods are exported abroad. MICHAEL UTTON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
POLICY: MAINTAINING OPEN MARKETS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 100 (2006).
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depend on stronger market regulation should instead opt for
jurisdictions with a history of antitrust enforcement.101 Where
possible, the law of the seat should be same as the governing law of
the contract, or at least not have opposing policy objectives.
Particularly for non-European parties, Switzerland is an attractive
arbitral seat because they have taken a hostile view of mandatory
antitrust law.102
Confidentiality agreements should be used in order to avoid
attracting the attention of public regulatory agencies or other
potential plaintiffs.
In the context of antitrust arbitration,
confidentiality is important because regulatory agencies may be able
to initiate parallel proceedings, apply for a stay of the arbitral
proceeding pending the resolution of their own investigation, or
pressure the parties into holding concurrent proceedings or sharing
evidence.103 Importantly, the agencies serve interests other than,
and possibly adverse to, those of the parties in arbitration. The
parties will wish to resolve their private disputes in a speedy and
cost-effective manner, whereas the administrative agencies serve
much broader interests.
Additionally, confidentiality of the award is important so as not
to encourage additional proceedings filed by third-party
stakeholders. Imagine an arbitration concerning a claim for breach
of contract, where the responding party successfully invokes a claim
for unfair trade practices. Since the arbitration is only binding on
the parties in the proceeding, there will be other potential claimants
who may now wish to invoke an unfair trade practices claim against
the original claimant. If the award remains confidential, those
potential claimants are less likely to become aware that they have a
claim, and also will not be able to rely on any of the findings in the
arbitral proceedings either to aid in their discovery or as persuasive
evidence in court.
Note also that this arrangement does not disadvantage the
winning party in arbitration. The respondent’s claim will already
101 E.g., members of the European Union, the United States. See generally, Barak
Orbach, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 Southern L. Rev. 605-655 (2012) (describing the evolution of American antitrust law as premised on trust busting); UTTON,
supra note 100, at 100 (describing the US and EU as having the most “highly developed and comprehensive policies” on antitrust enforcement).
102 See generally Berger, supra note 76, and accompanying text; supra note 100
and accompanying text.
103 See supra § 1.1.
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have been satisfied, and if anything the award may be easier to
collect if the other party is keen to avoid having it filed publicly in
court.104 Lastly, at the time the arbitration agreement is concluded
the parties will not know against whom a statutory antitrust claim
will be made, thereby both parties benefit from the protection of a
pre-emptive confidentiality clause compared to a post-dispute
agreement which will be harder to negotiate once a dispute has
arisen.105
5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Enforcement of Foreign Antitrust Laws
National courts should accept the application of foreign antitrust
laws and enforce antitrust awards based on the governing law of the
contract like they would any other. Piecemeal rejection of the
governing law contractually chosen by the Parties is inimical to
international arbitration doctrine. The purpose of the New York
Convention was “to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
international arbitral awards.”106 The status quo of refusing to
enforce awards on public policy grounds is inconsistent with this
goal.
The New York Convention does expressly allow for the
annulment or refusal to enforce an award on public policy
grounds,107 but this exception was not meant to have such farreaching effects.108 A public policy exception was necessary to
convince countries to give up substantial sovereignty by agreeing to
use the jurisdiction of their courts to enforce judgments they had no
hand in shaping. The exception should not become the rule.
Denying enforcement unless a specific mandatory law is applied
104 BORN, supra note 6, at 2801 (noting that even where confidentiality agreements exists, awards can be made public in enforcement actions); REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 4, at 140 ¶ 2.159 (discussing the view that awards filed in court
for enforcement purposes become public documents).
105 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 136 ¶ 2.145 (noting that confidentiality
agreements can be negotiated at the time of contracting or at the outset of arbitration).
106 GAILLARD, supra note 3, at 126, citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d
928, 932 (2nd Cir. 1983).
107 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V.
108 BORN, supra note 6, at 3661 (arguing that the structure and objectives of the
Convention suggest that member states cannot use national public policy to effectively repudiate their obligations under Articles III and V).
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constitutes an end-run on a national court’s obligations under the
New York Convention.
Allowing the resolution of private antitrust law claims in
binding international arbitration is precisely the type of incursion on
national sovereignty to which the member states agreed when
signing the New York Convention.109 Arbitration is a give and take.
In exchange for enforcing arbitral awards rendered under foreign
law, states are assured that awards rendered under their own law
will also be enforced with limited scrutiny. The same could be true
for antitrust law claims. If national courts were to enforce awards
based on foreign antitrust law, they would thereby ensure that their
own citizens (the public whose interest they are keen to protect) are
able to carry the protections of their own national competition laws
with them when they do business abroad. Is that not an interest
worth protecting?
Additionally, incursion on national sovereignty in the case of
antitrust issues is actually quite small. National courts need not fear
the slackening of statutory antitrust enforcement or the lack of a
coherent doctrine,110 because the award is constrained to the
resolution of issues between the parties to the arbitration111 and no
new national precedents are set in arbitral awards. An award would
not deprive other private or public stake holders the opportunity to
present related statutory claims in subsequent proceedings. In fact,
since arbitral awards normally remain unpublished,112 in many
cases they cannot even be used as persuasive authority in other
adjudicatory proceedings.
The purpose of allowing contracting parties to resolve antitrust
law issues in arbitration is not to circumvent national laws to which
the parties would otherwise be subject, but rather to embrace the
freedom of parties to choose the forum in which to resolve claims
Id.
See Blumenthal, supra note 33, at 1525 ¶ 42-053 (consumer protection cases
“seldom present complex policy choices [and] generally do not pose difficulties in
maintaining coherent and consistent enforcement.”).
111 BORN, supra note 6, at 1406 (“[T]he principle that only the parties to an international arbitration agreement are either bound or benefitted by that agreement
is fundamental to international arbitration.”).
112 See BORN, supra note 6, at 3825 (discussing the limited availability of arbitral
precedent because most awards are not published); see also LEW, supra note 36, p.
659 (noting that “arbitration proceedings normally remain confidential” and describing how voluntarily published opinions serve as a practical source of information in other arbitrations).
109
110
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against each other. Under a strict interpretation of party autonomy,
parties who derive a benefit from requiring adjudication of antitrust
issues in national courts could exclude those claims when drafting
an arbitration agreement. Ignoring the otherwise fundamental right
of parties to choose not to the exclude those issues from arbitration
is paternalistic and misplaced. International arbitration has proven
a successful legal innovation to deal, among other things, with
globalization and backlogged judicial systems.113 Carving out
exceptions for competition law claims between two private parties
imposes unnecessary costs and risks losing access to substantial
benefits.
5.2. Harmonization of Antitrust Law
The foreseeable complexity of these issues further highlights the
potential gains of greater harmonization in antitrust law.114
National governments could coordinate their antitrust laws to
produce more consistent rules. Similar gains have previously been
achieved in the realm of tariff regulations under the auspices of the
WTO.115 The advantage of such a regime would be that choice of
law questions would frequently become immaterial in the context of
antitrust, thereby increasing predictability and facilitating the
growth of cross-border business activities.
Unfortunately there are many obstacles to harmonization. First,
countries with different political ideations are unlikely to agree on
matters of antitrust policy.116 Centrally-planned economies such as
China have historically favored monopolies, whereas democratic
governments have encouraged greater market competition.117
113 See LEW, supra note 36, at 7 (explaining that neutrality and expedition are
some of the primary virtues of arbitration).
114 See Wood, supra note 71 (“To ‘harmonize’ one country’s [antitrust] law with
those of another must be a Good Thing.”).
115 For further discussion on the role of the WTO and intergovernmental agencies, see infra § 5.3.
116 Stephans, infra note 118, at 185-186 (arguing that politics explains at least of
the variation in antitrust policy).
117 See Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Economic Growth, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CRITICAL ROLES OF COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY, Vol. 2 (Eleanor Fox & Abel Mateus eds. 2011) (finding that antitrust
law has a stronger effect on economic growth than the level of democracy); But see
Harry First & Spencer Weber, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2543 (2013) (discussing how U.S. antitrust enforcement has become increasingly influenced by partisan politics and therefore less focused on “free” markets).
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Further, given variations in economic development, it is
questionable that a one-size-fits-all approach to antitrust would
even be desirable.118 Depending on the context, businesses
themselves may oppose harmonization.119 Finally, some have
argued that harmonization would inflict high agency costs and
would restrict legal innovation.120
Thus harmonization could solve part of the mandatory antitrust
law problem, but it comes with so many attendant difficulties that it
is unattractive in practice.
Depending on antitrust law
harmonization to solve the multiparty mandatory law problem is
like taking a shower to get ketchup off your thumb. It’ll work, but
it would be much easier to just wash your hands. Enforcing awards
based on the antitrust law policies of the governing law of the
contract (regardless of whether it concords with local practice or not)
is the hand-washing solution in this case.
5.3. Intergovernmental Organizations
Some have argued that an intergovernmental agency or
international trade organization could most efficiently resolve
international antitrust issues,121 however the preceding discussion
on multiparty arbitration demonstrates just a few of the drawbacks
of such a proposal. National courts have ignored the otherwise
established principles of party autonomy in order to evade the
118 See McGinnis, supra note 80, at 556 (describing reasons why antitrust policy
in developed countries is not designed to maximize consumer welfare).
119 Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the
WTO, 48 HARV. INT'L L. J. 383, 428 (2007) (noting that corporations are likely to favor
harmonization on merger rules, but oppose confluence of rules governing market
dominance or cartels).
120 McGinnis, supra note 80 at 554-68.
121 Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 355, 359 (2004) (contending that a unified regime is necessary in part because
current choice of law rules result in inefficient regulation); Robertson, supra note 71,
at 156-157 (discussing how states’ individual competition laws have led to failed
applications); But see Alex Lawson, WTO a Tough Venue to Challenge China on Antitrust Law, LAW 360 (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/
576691/wto-a-tough-venue-to-challenge-china-on-antitrust-law [perma.cc/X8LZZYMZ] (last visited February 1, 2016) (discussing why cases challenging the unequal application of antitrust laws in the WTO are rare); Bradford, supra note 117, at
384-85 (arguing that strategic interests make a unified antitrust regime at the WTO
unattractive); Paul Stephans, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 173, 209 (2005) (“[G]iving an international
agency responsibility for supervising how states exercise their jurisdiction would
lead to the exact same agency problems” as allowing them to self-regulate).
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perceived incursion on national sovereignty to decide fundamental
issues of domestic public policy.122 The establishment of an
international antitrust adjudicative body or adjudication under the
WTO123 would not alleviate these concerns.
Further, establishing an international organization would do
very little to alleviate the drawbacks of parallel or dual track
proceedings.124 The field of international arbitration has grown out
of a desire to resolve disputes efficiently125 and in a neutral forum,126
and national courts have repeatedly enforced the right of parties to
define the scope of issues to be decided in arbitration.127 Parties need
to be able to raise antitrust defenses in arbitration, and an
intergovernmental organization is no substitute for binding
arbitration specifically tailored to meet the needs of the parties.
6. CONCLUSION
Mandatory antitrust law is a thorn in the side of international
arbitration.
As multiparty arbitrations increasingly address
competition law issues, tribunals must grapple with the tension
between party autonomy and possibly conflicting mandatory laws.
The application of mandatory antitrust laws in multiparty
arbitration has the potential to produce uncertainty, forumshopping, and conflicting results.
Having established the arbitrability of an antitrust issue in a
multiparty arbitration, arbitrators will have to weigh a number of
considerations in determining which mandatory law should apply.
See supra § 1.1.
See Kukovec, supra note 5, at 43-45 (analyzing whether the WTO should be
given a role in international antitrust adjudication).
124 See supra §1.1.
125 See BORN, supra note 7, at 61 (“Procedural flexibility, informality and efficiency were key attributes of the arbitral process, and central to the business community’s preference for arbitration.”). See also, ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note
56, at art. 22 (“[T]he arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make every effort to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to
the complexity and value of the dispute.”).
126 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 32 ¶¶ 1.90-1.91 (describing the advantage of resolving an international dispute before a neutral tribunal).
127 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that the parties
agreed to arbitrate statutory antitrust claim); But see, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., Case
C-126/97 (holding that national courts must raise domestic antitrust issues as a
matter of public policy when deciding whether to enforce and award—regardless
of whether the issue was raised by the parties in arbitration).
122
123
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Ideally, tribunals would respect party autonomy and only apply the
governing law of the contract to antitrust claims that arise in
connection with the contract. However, due to enforcement
concerns the law of the arbitral seat and the laws of the most likely
places of enforcement must also be considered. As a last resort
tribunals could apply different mandatory laws to various parties or
refuse joinder of an additional party with a conflicting applicable
mandatory law.
The preceding discussion demonstrates the need for change at
the level of national courts. International arbitration depends on the
broad enforceability of awards.128 States that have signed the New
York Convention have a responsibility to recognize awards made
under foreign law, and this should include antitrust laws.
Alternative solutions such as the harmonization of national antitrust
laws or the creation of an intergovernmental regulatory scheme are
problematic and ultimately less attractive solutions. Resolution of
antitrust issues in binding arbitration allows private parties to
efficiently resolve disputes with minimal incursion on national
sovereignty.
The scope of this problem is not limited to antitrust issues.
Similar concerns arise in other areas of law that strongly implicate
public policy, such as environmental law, intellectual property law,
and securities regulation.129 Likewise, though the use of class
actions in international arbitration is still rare,130 developments in
that sphere may further complicate this analysis in the future. What
is an arbitrator to do? Proceed carefully, and hope the award is
enforced.

128 BORN, supra note 6, at 102 (noting that mandatory recognition of awards,
subject only extremely limited exceptions, is an extremely innovative feature of the
New York Convention).
129 Brower, supra note 48, at 1130 (listing common examples of mandatory
laws).
130 See S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere, 30 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 1, (2008) (identifying emerging issues in international class arbitration);
Kessler, supra note 16 (discussing antitrust class arbitration in U.S. domestic context) citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (upholding
class arbitration waiver in form contract).
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